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Rector, Russian State University for the Humanities(1)
Every day Russian foreign policy is becoming tougher, in many cases more clearly 
defined and independent. What lies behind these changes in reality, and what may be 
the consequences for the world, as well as for Russia herself?
The official "Yel'tsin doctrine," as expressed in a message to the president of the 
Federal Assembly, presents these changes in terms of the consistent promotion of 
Russian (rossiiskie) national interests.
The 'Yel'tsin Doctrine'
The basic principles of this doctrine are as follows:
• A strong Russia is the most effective guarantee of stability over the entire territory 
of the former Soviet Union;
• Russia should assume the role of peacemaker in the post-Soviet political space;
• A key aspect of Russian foreign policy is the strengthening of the CIS;
• Integration within the framework of the CIS should not be harmful to Russia's own 
economic interests;
• In defending her legitimate state interests Russia has the right, if necessary, to act 
firmly and toughly;
• Russia is obliged to protect the interests of Russians (rossiyane) living in the "near 
abroad." If their rights are violated, this is not only an internal matter for their 
country of residence, but also a Russian state matter;
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• Russia is against the expansion of NATO through the membership of additional 
European states, unless Russia itself becomes a member of NATO;
• Russia should defend the interests of Russian capital both in domestic and 
international markets; and
• Russia is in favor of imposing order on the international arms trade provided that 
Russia's commercial interests are respected.
All this could be viewed as well-founded--or at least one might consider it justifiable to 
regard all these principles calmly and with comprehension as reflecting Russia's turn 
toward self-interest and a concern for its own needs. But if this were the case, why is 
there such growing alarm over these changes both in Russia and abroad? Is there a 
real basis for viewing these new guidelines--as many clearly do--not as the protection of 
Russia's national interests, but as a "new Russian imperialism"?
Unfortunately, there are grounds for this.
The provisions of the military doctrine stating that Russia's interests extend to the entire 
territory of the former USSR, as well as the attempts to impose a particular foreign 
policy on all the countries of the former European "socialist camp," are putting millions 
of people in a difficult position-- after all, they had been living under the belief that they 
had permanently freed themselves from Moscow's control.
Return of Great Power Drives
"Great power ideology" (ideologiya derzhavnosti) again is being proclaimed openly in 
many quarters as a component of official state policy. Russia has been waging 
undeclared wars in many areas of the former USSR--wars that can be termed 
imperialistic.
The worst problems have arisen in what Russia calls the "near abroad," and relate to 
the policies followed by the Russian government toward these former Soviet republics. 
Viewed from outside, events might appear as disconnected, but if the problem is 
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examined more closely one can always discover an aspect which, as a rule, is 
concealed--i.e., Russia's interest in keeping control of the Black Sea shoreline,(2) of a 
major uranium mine in Tajikistan, of plants belonging to the military industrial complex 
dispersed all over former Soviet territory--an aircraft plant in Tbilisi or defense 
enterprises in Pridnestrovie.(3) But this is only the beginning...
The desire to bring the former Soviet republics under Moscow's control is becoming 
ever more patent, the aim being to allot to them the role earlier played by the countries 
of the "socialist camp"--i.e., a buffer zone between Russia and the Far Abroad.
Neighbors Coerced into CIS
The divorce between Russia and the republics of the former Soviet Union failed to take 
a civilized course; accordingly there have been quarrels over the Black Sea Fleet, 
nuclear weapons and space flight facilities. Now we have Russia's new desire to compel 
the former Soviet republics to join the CIS by employing economic pressure--despite the 
enormous costs that this entails. Unlike the former USSR, however, the Russian 
government assumes no responsibility for what may occur in these republics, whether it 
be slaughter in Georgia or famine in Armenia. In other words, Moscow is concerned to 
exert military, political, and economic control over the former Soviet republics, but not to 
take responsibility to ensure, say, that conditions for the population of Uzbekistan are 
similar to those prevailing in Russia, that there are comparable levels of infant mortality 
in Azerbaijan or equivalent living standards in Tajikistan. Who can approve of such a 
policy?
In order to understand the basic principles underlying the "new" foreign policy, one 
needs to know what criteria are being applied by the Russian Federation to determine 
which former Soviet republics are to be supported, and which are not.
Russian Military Intervention
In cases where there are attempts (by the newly sovereign republics) to demonstrate 
genuine independence and to achieve freedom from Moscow, Russia supports 
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"national-liberation" movements against these republics under the pretext of protecting 
the Russian-speaking population. Sometimes the direct involvement of Russian troops 
is camouflaged and presented to the world as a "peacekeeping mission" in an area 
where interethnic conflicts have arisen. It is evident, moreover, that there is no 
willingness to evacuate remaining Russian army divisions stationed in these republics 
(after initial partial withdrawals in 1991-92). Recently, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev 
declared at a conference of Russian ambassadors to the CIS and Baltic countries that 
the near abroad is the source of the main threats to Russia's vital interests. In Kozyrev's 
opinion, Russia's military presence in the Commonwealth countries should be 
maintained.(4)
Imperial intentions are evident in many different areas. The Pridnestrovian Republics 
that was set up artificially, thanks to the efforts of former Supreme Soviet chairman 
Anatoli Luk'yanov and the "power ministries" of the Soviet Union, was given Russian 
support in order to bring the Moldovans to heel. In September 1993, a military parade of 
Pridnestrovian Republic forces was shown on television. Who has been funding this 
"government," both during the military conflict and in recent months? It certainly was not 
Moldova, of which the Pridnestrovian Republic forms part, since the Pridnestrovian 
authorities rejected the "services" of Moldavia while the fighting was continuing. Is 
Russia providing secret financial support? By direct support from the state budget, or 
through "credits" granted by the Russian Central Bank? What can be the legal basis for 
such payments? Or is the government specially funding certain Russian enterprises, 
which then transfer money to the Pridnestrovian capital, Tiraspol'? What, if any, is the 
role played by the Russian Central Bank? Is the bank's head, Viktor Gerashchenko, 
"aware" of this--moreover, was it not he who was responsible earlier for transferring 
CPSU money abroad? I believe I am not the only one who is interested in obtaining 
replies to these questions.
Caucasian Wars
There is an analogous situation in the Caucasus. In reality, Russia was in a state of war 
with Georgia, but the Russian government denied this, using very strange language in 
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its public statements. If, to illustrate the situation, one were to compare Abkhazia(6) with 
Russia's Tambov oblast', the question would arise from where the Tambov governor 
could obtain SU-27s, MiG-29s, modem tanks and thousands of Kalashnikovs?(7) 
Where did Abkhazia acquire such large quantities of airplanes, tanks, and artillery? Who 
provided the help needed to enable Abkhazia to carry out major military operations? 
Who has been funding arms deliveries and the upkeep of the Abkhaz army as well as 
hundreds of "volunteers" from Russia?
In this case I do not plan to accuse the Russian authorities of first taking the side of 
Abkhazia, and then going over to the other side. We know how this war began--
Shevardnadze was partly to blame, Ardzinba(8) was also at fault, and now it is difficult 
to say who was the more culpable. But the principal aspect is the still-unclarified role of 
Russia in this war for instance, was it considered necessary to help the Abkhazians 
against Georgia, which had "overdone it" in its striving for national independence?(9) In 
any case, Abkhazia was helped, with the result that the Abkhazians "liberated" their 
entire territory, thanks to Russian troops and hardware.
Did things go too far? Anger was replaced by friendship--now Russia supported 
Shevardnadze and forced him to join the CIS.(10) Why? Is this just a symptom of the 
general situation? Russian government agencies have begun actively to achieve or 
maintain control over the territories that belonged to the former Soviet empire. Recent 
hearings that were held by the Duma Committee on CIS Affairs constitute further 
confirmation of this. The criticism made of the (Georgian) treaty showed that the political 
opposition views Yel'tsin's foreign policy as still insufficiently imperialistic. The proposal 
was advanced that Russia should not guarantee the territorial integrity of Georgia, but 
act instead as an arbiter between Georgia and its autonomous regions--which would 
mean in practice that Russia would hold Georgia by the throat after bringing it to its 
knees . One means to achieve this would be to separate the conflicting sides in South 
Ossetia(11) along a demarcation line reflecting the boundary of the area controlled by 
Russian forces. In practice, this would mean the annexation by Russia of a portion of 
Georgian territory.
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To turn to the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, obviously there is an abundance of local 
causes, but in this case also Russia has played a role that is not irreproachable. Here 
too Russian economic interests are apparent, and business kingpins have learned to 
use the Russian government in order to affect the course of military operations in the 
region. For instance, the attempt of the Azerbaijan leadership to set up a consortium for 
the exploitation of oil deposits without Russian participation immediately resulted in two 
regions of Azerbaijan being occupied by the (ethnically Armenian) Nagorno-Karabakh 
army, which then pushed forward right up to Azerbaijan's Iranian border.(12) However, 
once Russia's Lukoil concern was included in Azerbaijan's consortium, the Azeri army 
suddenly came to enjoy military successes leading to the liberation of the Armenian-
occupied territories.
Many vague words have been uttered about "strategic goals," but there have been no 
exhaustive official statements by the Russian Foreign Ministry, the government, or the 
president on this subject. Russia's strategy should be comprehensible, if only to enable 
the public to know how to interpret it. If we say that democracy means an open society, 
Russia's interests must be publicly known. They cannot be concealed, as was formerly 
the case.
Russia's War in Central Asia
The most alarming situation today concerns Central Asia. Russia continues to be in a 
state of undeclared war-- a war with unannounced objectives. In Tajikistan, Russia is 
fighting on the side of a (pro-Uzbek) puppet regime. The Tajik government is a 
reactionary regime that is mercilessly crushing the slightest signs of free thought and 
democracy in the country . Persons calling for democratic reforms are being forced to 
live in virtual exile outside Tajikistan--in Russia, India, or elsewhere. Meanwhile, the 
Russian authorities are helping this regime to finish off what remains of the Tajik 
opposition and the nation's democratic forces. Andrei Kozyrev, our democratic minister 
of foreign affairs, travels to Kirgizia and Kazakhstan to persuade their government to 
come out in support of Russia over this conflict, so that Russia, instead of fighting alone 
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in Tajikistan, could act under the cover of the flags of several different countries-- as 
during the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.
Moreover, when we look more closely we see that some steps undertaken by the 
regime, which originally seemed to be purely political, in fact were motivated by material 
considerations. Russia's participation in the civil war underway in Tajikistan does not 
amount merely to a struggle for control over territory that formerly was part of the 
USSR; it is explained also by a desire to plug a gap in Russia's border, since it would 
require far greater expenditure to establish an impervious frontier between Russia and 
the newly independent Central Asian republics than to re-establish the old Soviet (Tajik-
Uzbek-Turkmen) border with Afghanistan and Iran. Tajikistan's joining the ruble 
monetary area amounts in fact to a not-inconsiderable payment for a service rendered.
We also find here a reflection of the hope that the former empire can be restored. It is 
one matter when communists demand the restoration of the USSR at public meetings, 
but for that to be the official position adopted by the Russian government and the de 
facto policy followed by the authorities is altogether a different matter.
The experience of the 10-year war in Afghanistan evidently has taught our present 
leadership nothing. People are already dying, but if current policies continue, not only 
the welfare, but the very lives of thousands of Russians living in Russia and abroad will 
be placed in danger.
Coercive pressure to bring about greater integration with Russia is being exerted on the 
former Soviet republics not only by military methods. Financial pressure is also 
becoming a powerful lever to this end.
Financial Pressure 
One example of this is the way in which Belarus' was brought into the ruble zone. When 
the Russian Central Bank hastily carried out a banknote exchange operation last year, it 
justified this action with the supposed urgent need to isolate the domestic monetary 
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circulation within Russia from the use of the ruble as currency in the countries of the 
near abroad, thus finally turning the ruble into the Russian national currency. However, 
very soon further actions which were taken by the Central Bank made one doubt that 
this had been really its main goal.
Following the banknote exchange, immediate transfers of ruble funds were made to 
several neighboring countries-- a decision which perhaps could be explained on a 
rational basis. Yet, right after this, under the guise of measures to create a "new type" of 
ruble zone, attempts began to recreate an unsullied ruble zone of the most blatant "old 
type." Thus in the case of Belarus', de facto the country will not have its own budget, but 
financially will be entirely dependent on Moscow, just as in earlier times. Later, it will be 
possible to follow the same course in relation to Moldova, Ukraine, Tajikistan, etc.
In attempting to explain the changes in Moscow's official foreign policy, many observers 
point not unjustifiably to their genesis in domestic politics. Moreover, it is noted that 
recently Moscow's foreign policy course has become alarmingly independent of 
Russia's real national interests, becoming instead a derivative of the correlation of 
political forces within the country.
In particular, this course is being determined by the efforts of the authorities to wrest the 
patriotic battle flag from the hands of the opposition, as well as by the Kremlin's 
intention to harken more closely to the voices coming from Russia's hinterland. These, 
however, are the voices of a country that, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
and the loss of its past greatness, is suffering from an inferiority complex, the voice of a 
country that feels humiliated and insulted, now that it is no longer listened to as in 
former times.
Russia's 'Unmodernity'
All the factors listed may be considered major causes of the recent changes in foreign 
policy. Yet they are not exhaustive. There are further reasons that are both more general 
and more profound. These might be defined succinctly as arising from the 
8
"unmodernity" of modern Russia. The special characteristics of the Russian 
environment and of Russian history, the country ' s geopolitical position, its age-old 
autocracy, and finally three-quarters of a century of Soviet totalitarianism--all these 
factors provide reasons why Russia dropped out of the modern world both 
technologically and politically. However, in the military sense, and in the ability to apply 
coercive pressure, we can still do a great deal. Consequently we are knocking on the 
door of the modern world with what God gave us so far, i.e., our Asianness.
For instance, last year we made a big splash on the world market with our exports of 
aluminum, astounding everyone with the low price at which it was being offered, and 
indeed we appeared to come out ahead. But how did we manage to do it? Again, it was 
by Asian methods. We produce aluminum with greatly outdated energy-intensive 
technologies, and Oleg Soskovets(13) is able to freeze this technological lag by 
artificially holding down energy prices. He is able to preserve the unmodern in the midst 
of the modern, since he is all-powerful in economic matters, with a total of 14 ministries 
subordinated to him, in addition to enjoying the support of all the political forces which 
have turned their backs on reform.
Soskovets is not alone in this, however. Many of the centuries-old extremes and 
abnormalities in our economy are being vigorously preserved by such officials as A. 
Zaveryukha, Yu. Skokov,(14) and V. Chernomyrdin. This is why we are selling products 
that cause alarm, discord, and death, i.e., weaponry, missile launchers, and military 
missions.
We find the same phenomenon in politics: a striving to restore past greatness without 
the attainment of stable statehood, democracy, or a proper economic basis. As a 
consequence of all these factors, the world is struck by unexpected foreign policy 
actions such as the strained Bosnian initiative, or the peculiar paradoxes of our fledgling 
diplomacy.
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Playing on the strong imperialistic attitudes of post-Soviet society, the Russian 
authorities are endeavoring to offer up to it--as an oath of fealty to great-power 
aspirations--a number of achievements that they have to their credit, i.e., the 
maintenance of military control over the entire territory of the former USSR; a war in 
Tajikistan to preserve the inviolability of borders; a veto on the admission of the Central 
and East European countries to NATO; the removal from Russia's agenda of the issue 
of returning the South Kuriles to Japan; treaties providing for military bases and the 
stationing of Russian troops in the Transcaucasus; deployment of the 14th Army in 
Pridnestrovie for an indefinite period; the preservation of the Black Sea Fleet as a 
Russian fleet; the preservation of Russia's nuclear monopoly within the borders of the 
former USSR; our military bases and troops in the Baltic Region; steadily increasing 
pressure on the countries of the near abroad in order to "safeguard the rights of the 
Russian-speaking population" can all this still not be enough?
"Not enough!" responds the inflamed consciousness of a traumatized society, and there 
occurs a marvelous transformation: the earlier romanticism of Russian Westernizers 
assumes hawkish forms.
Self-fulfilling Prophecy
Many readers will remember Andrei Kozyrev's December 1992 Stockholm address. [In 
his Stockholm address, Foreign Minister Kozyrev (regarded at the time as pro-Western 
and a model of moderation) spoke in startlingly imperial, chauvinistic, and anti-Western 
terms. He then stalked off, leaving his audience in shock. Persuaded by Secretary 
Eagleburger to return, Kozyrev explained that he had adopted this tone simply to warn 
Westerners what kind of nightmare to expect if his and Yel'tsin's ultranationalist 
opponents were to gain the upper hand in Moscow. However, in the course of 1993-94, 
Kozyrev's own statements increasingly came to resemble, in tone and content, the 
sentiment he had attributed in 1992 to his "red-brown" adversaries. Thus his Stockholm 
speech indeed was "prophetic"--but in foreshadowing Kozyrev's own political 
transformation into a spokesman of Russian neo-imperialism--ed.] The minister of 
foreign affairs spoke as if impelled by a kind of nightmare, and he made up his mind to 
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take this extraordinarily paradoxical step (unprecedented in diplomatic history) fearing 
that the dreadful dream might prove to be prophetic.
Few would have thought then that, only a few months later, none other than Kozyrev 
himself would, in the words of the famous Soviet song, "transform a fairytale into life."
Notes:
1 The outstanding historian Dr. Afansyev is an ever-lonelier voice among Russian 
democratic intellectuals willing to risk isolation to speak out against his government's 
neo-imperialism.
2 The reference is to the successful effort by Russian military elements to help Abkhaz 
Moslem separatists to implement the secession of Abkhazia, with its long Black Sea 
shore, from the Georgian Republic. (ed.)
3 The reference is to the Moldovian Republic's "Transdnestrian" portion which the 
Russian 14th Army, under the ultranationalist General Lebed, has been attempting to 
establish as a separatist, ethnically Russian state. (ed.) 4 Kozyrev stated his opposition 
to final dates for complete Russian military evacuation, even where such dates had 
been stipulated in bilateral treaties with the newly independent republics. (ed.)
5 See note 2, supra. (ed.) 6 See note I, supra. (ed.) 7 Ethnic Abkhaz separatist 
mountaineers, numbering fewer than 91,000 (out of Abkhazia's--mainly Georgian 
population of 524,000) suddenly and miraculously were in possession of such an ultra-
modem airforce. (ed.) 8 General Vladislav Ardzinba, commander in chief of the armed 
forces of the Republic of Abkhazia." (ed.)
9 Georgia demanded, and Yel'tsin's government originally recognized, Georgian 
sovereignty overall the former Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, including Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia. (ed.)
10 After Georgia was defeated by joint Russian-Abkhaz forces, Georgia's leader 
Shevardnadze, having failed to obtain help from the West, sued for peace--which 
Moscow granted, in return for de facto acceptance of Abkhazian secession, joining the 
CIS, Russian troops deploying along the Turkish frontiers, and "garrisoning" Georgia's 
four main cities. (ed.)
11
11 Ossetian, like Abkhaz, mountaineers seceded from Georgia with Russian aid and/or 
connivance. See also note 8, supra. (ed.)
12 Like the fewer than 91,000 Abkhaz separatists, fewer than 146,000 Armenian 
separatists from Nagorno-Karabakh were able "miraculously" to defeat am adversary 
with a huge demographic superiority (over 5,800,000 ethnic Azeris). (ed.)
13 Oleg Soskovets, First Deputy Prime Minister and chairman of the (government) 
Commissions for Operational Questions and for Export Control. (ed.)
14 Aleksandr Zaveryukha, Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the (government) 
Council for Agrarian Policy (former Minister of Agriculture), and Yuri Skokov, chairman of 
the Federation of Russian Manufacturers and former secretary of the State Security 
Council. (ed.)
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